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Abstract
Middleboxes are widely used in today’s Internet, especially for security and performance. Mid-
dleboxes classify, filter and shape traffic, therefore interfering with application behaviour and
performing new network functions for end hosts. Recent studies have uncovered and studied
middleboxes in different types of networks.
In order to understand the middlebox interference on traffic flows and explore the involved ASes,
our methodology relies on a client-server architecture, to be able to observe both directions of
the middlebox interaction. Meanwhile, probing with increasing TTL values provides us chances
to inspect behaviour of middleboxes hop by hop.
Implementing our methodologies, we exploit a large-scale proxy infrastructure Luminati, to de-
tect HTTP-interacting middleboxes across the Internet. We collect a large-scale dataset from van-
tage points distributed in nearly 10,000 ASes across 196 countries. Our results provide abundant
evidence for middleboxes deployed across more than 1000 ASes. We observe various middle-
box interference in both directions of traffic flows, and across a wide range networks, including
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Middleboxes such as firewalls, load balancing switches and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) boxes
have been a major part in today’s network infrastructure. A middlebox could be defined as any
intermediary network device performing functions other than standard functions of an IP router
on datagram between two end hosts [1]. Currently, the main goals driving the deployment of
middleboxes are security (to enhance the visibility of network traffic and enable the enforcement
of security policies) [2, 3, 4, 5] and performance enhancement (through traffic shaping, caching
and transparent proxying) [2, 6, 7, 8].
In comparison with other Internet devices, such as switches and routers, middleboxes are com-
plex, as they operate on packets from network layer to application layer at line rate. Middle-
boxes interfere with end-to-end packet transmission, application functionality, and restricting or
preventing end host applications from performing properly [1, 9]. In general, the middlebox
interference can be categorized into three types. First, middleboxes intentionally drop or filter
packets as policies [10, 11]. For example, network administrators filter P2P file sharing traffic to
avoid the legal implications of copyrighted files [12]. Second, middleboxes modify packet con-
tents [13, 10, 5]. Some web proxies modify HTTP headers to control meta information between
client and server (e.g., cache preferences). Finally, in order to perform other functions as net-
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work policies, middleboxes inject forged packets, e.g., for blocking purposes. For instance, the
Great Firewall of China (GFC) blocks some certain sites by injecting spoofed DNS responses,
and causes intrusional damage in terms of Internet censorship [14]. As a summary, middleboxes
have the ability to inspect and manipulate traffic flows, interfere with their end-to-end behaviour,
and not only have positive impact on network traffic but also affect the behaviours of end host
applications.
1.2 Motivation
Middleboxes are widely used in various types of networks. Indeed, according to a survey of 57
enterprise network administrators, it was concluded that there are probably as many middleboxes
as routers inside the network [2]. Also, the survey of edge-network behaviour [15] showed the
evidence of middlebox traffic manipulation in common ISPs. In addition, lots of governments
use middleboxes to implement network censorship [16, 17, 18]. GFC is the most complex mid-
dlebox system that operates with numerous protocols ([19, 20, 21, 22, 23]). The governments
of Iran, Yemen, Tunisia and Sudan use commercial software in state-controlled servers, and cen-
sor all outgoing flows [17, 24, 11]. It is claimed that middleboxes are distributed in everywhere
of today’s network. However, we have limited knowledge about where and how middleboxes
interfere with traffic flows now.
At the same time, Internet traffic is changing (e.g., HTTPS accounts for a significant portion of
Internet traffic now [25]). Considering the complexity of middleboxes, applications and network
traffic, we argue that methodologies are needed to detect and analyse middlebox interference for
different kinds of applications.
In this report, we analyse the potential impart of middleboxes in today’s network and explain the
reasons why we care about middleboxes; we summary the lessons learnt from prior work, and
introduce our own measurement methodologies to detect and locate middlebox interference on
traffic flows; we show the measurement results in a commercial platform which provides vantage
points all over the world, and illustrate middlebox behaviour in different kinds of network.
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1.3 Contribution
Our contributions are twofold. First, we introduce our methodology to detect and locate middle-
box interference based on a client-server architecture. We also explain how to use the Luminati
platform to run large-scale measurements and get a global dataset from our measurements.
Second, based on our methodology, we find evidence for a significant amount of middlebox
interference on both directions of the traffic flows in different networks. According to our dataset,
we observe a wide variety of injected HTTP headers in HTTP messages, some known and some
never reported before. Surprisingly, we even observe new headers that are only added by mobile
networks and cloud platforms.
Overall, we find that injected HTTP headers expose the presence of multiple types of middle-
boxes across diverse networks and most of middleboxes are at the edge of networks. Further, the
interference on HTTP responses often reveals the corresponding functions of the middleboxes,
such as proxying, caching, URL filtering, and WAN optimization.
This report is structured as follows: we present the introduction and motivation in this session.
Afterwards, we review the status of current studies in Chapter 2. We present the measurement de-
sign process, and explain the methodology in Chapter 3. We present our study result in Chapter 4.





Middleboxes play a crucial role in the modern Internet infrastructure [24, 10, 2]. The growing
benefits of using middleboxes and unknown middlebox interference on network traffic flows mo-
tivated researchers in technical and regulatory community to examine middleboxes from various
aspects. In this chapter, we review some studies to understand the presence of middleboxes, the
motivations of measuring behaviour of middleboxes, and essential methodologies of detecting
middleboxes.
2.1 Middleboxes Taxonomy
The word ”middlebox” was introduced by Lixia Zhang to describe new phenomenon in Internet.
Afterwards, B.Carpenter defined middlebox in the work [1], ”a middlebox is any intermediary
device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the
datagram path between a source host and destination host.” Meanwhile, a middlebox should not
be clarified as a physical device necessarily, it could be virtual and interpreted as a network
function.
As we know, the classical Internet architecture is based on hourglass model [26] and end-to-
end principle [27]. In the old architecture, the only boxes between two end hosts are IP routers,
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which provide the function of forwarding packets purely [28]. However, insertion of middleboxes
breaks old network model. Middleboxes not only spread new functions throughout the network,
but also bring new challenges for network communication sessions.
Furthermore, middleboxes are complex, they operate at network, transparent, upper layers, and
even a mixture. RFC3234 [1] classifies middleboxes in a multidimensional taxonomy and gives
examples to describe characterisations of them. For example, NAT, firewall, IDS/IPS, load bal-
ancer and web proxy are all examples for middleboxes, and they work across different layers for
diverse purposes.
2.2 Middleboxes Today
Middleboxes are widely used and play an important role in different kinds of networks [9]. More-
over, the behaviour of middleboxes is complicated, while the impact on applications is poorly
understood. In this subsection, we describe some prior work, state current deployments of mid-
dleboxes, and illustrate our motivations in details.
2.2.1 Middleboxes in Enterprise Networks
Sherry et al. [2] in 2012 presented a detailed study of middlebox deployments. In this study, the
researchers conducted a survey of 57 enterprise network administrators, including the number
of middleboxes deployed, personnel dedicated to middleboxes, and challenges faced in admin-
istering related middleboxes. Based on the survey, they undertook a systematic exploration of
requirements and design spaces for outsourcing middleboxes, implemented APLOMB, a practical
service for outsourcing enterprise middlebox processing to the cloud.
This work is the first large-scale survey of middlebox deployments in research community. Their
dataset illustrates that typical enterprise network is a complex ecosystem of firewalls, IDSes, web
proxies, and other network devices. The number of middleboxes in each enterprise is compara-
ble to its number of traditional switches and routers. All of these are vital evidences to show
middleboxes are widely used in enterprise network and affect the Internet infrastructure. On the
other hand, the design of APLOMB aims to reduce cost of middlebox infrastructure, while redi-
recting traffic through APLOMB may cost bandwidth, affect application performance and bring
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security challenges at the same time. For instance, as shown in evaluation part in this work,
three common applications (HTTP, BitTorrent, VoIP) suffer little when their traffic is redirected
through APLOMB. In summary, moving middleboxes to cloud solves the problems caused by
cost, management complexity, and failures of middlebox infrastructure. But it is needed to un-
derstand how middleboxes deal with real traffic flows and take the middlebox interference into
account.
2.2.2 Middleboxes in ISP Networks
Kreibich et al. [15] presented Netalyzr, a network measurement and debugging service that eval-
uates the properties of Internet access and connectivity in ISP networks. In this study, they have
recorded 130,000 runs of the system from 99,000 different public IP addresses, constructing a
large-scale picture of many facets of Internet edge behaviour (outgoing port filtering, hidden in-
network HTTP caches, DNS manipulations, NAT behaviour, path MTU issues, IPv6 support, and
access-modem buffer capacity) as well as tracking each behaviour’s technological evolution over
time.
The dataset of this work consists sessions from 6884 organizations across 186 countries, covering
most ISP networks. The results reveal some systemic problems, such as difficulties with frag-
mentation, the unreliability of path MTU discovery, restrictions on DNSSEC deployment. Also,
it shows evidence of DNS NXDOMAIN wildcarding, HTTP proxying and caching. Though, the
original usage of Netalyzr was for Internet users to obtain analysis of their Internet connectivity,
their findings illustrate some behaviour of middleboxes. For instance, some NATs and firewalls
are DNS-aware devices, some HTTP proxies open new connections to end servers and inject new
headers to HTTP requests.
The researchers also used Netalyzr in recent study of cellular networks [29, 30], showing that
13% (of 299 mobile operators) were manipulating headers [29], and part of these manipulating
headers were modified by middleboxes for user privacy, security and network operations. At
the same time, Netalyzr detected the presence of transparent HTTP proxies in 58% of cellular
sessions (covering 296 operators in 119 countries), describing how proxies modified or blocked
DNS and HTTP traffic [30].
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Xu [31] undertook an analysis of proxy behaviour in 2015, and demonstrated how transparent
web proxies interacted with HTTP traffic in four major US cellular carriers. With full control
over the client devices and servers, researchers explored proxy properties through various exper-
iment configurations, varying parameters (e.g. content to fetch), socket properties (e.g. server
IP address or port), HTTP configuration (including modified headers), and even adjust network
conditions.
Based on experiment results, researchers exhibited the application-level features of web prox-
ies, such as HTTP caching, HTTP redirection, connection and so on. More specifically, there
were three key conclusions characterizing transparent web proxies in ISPs. First, each carrier
implements proxying policies differently, thus the speed and quality of downloaded contents for
users are affected. Second, the split connections improve performance for larger flows (up to
45%), while they have negligible impact on small ones (less than 100KB). Last, proxies inter-
pose on connections to almost all popular web sites, but Google’s YouTube traffic could bypasses
T-Mobile proxies, which maybe due to a special arrangements for certain content. All of these
findings notice us the behaviour of web proxies is diverse, and their impact on performance for
web workloads is varied. Moreover, end users may remain unaware of the existence of web proxy
typically, we are motivated that it is necessary to explore large-scale and in-depth measurements
to understand behaviour of middleboxes and their impact on applications.
The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) [32] has processed some network mea-
surements which aim to detect internet censorship, traffic manipulation and other signs of surveil-
lance since 2012. The OONI project is under the Tor project, collecting millions of network tests
across more than 90 countries. The researchers published the testing methodology to identify
HTTP Header Field Manipulation and the collected HTTP headers on the website. According to
the published data, we observed that lots of manipulated HTTP headers were injected by proxies,
caches and other network middleboxes.
2.2.3 Middleboxes and Internet Censorship
Recent years, Internet censorship is achieved by using nation-wide middleboxes in some coun-
tries (e.g. China, Yemen, Sudan). The work [11] is a survey on Internet censorship detection
which explains censoring mechanisms in detail. In this work, the researchers gave a charac-
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terization of current censoring systems, proposed related analysis and discussion of censorship
detection techniques. From this work, we find lots of evidence to describe the usage of middle-
boxes in censorship, such as, IP blocking, TCP reset injection, DNS injection, transparent proxy,
HTTP warning page injection and so on. Additionally, the performance impact (e.g. increased
packet loss and delay) made by middleboxes attracts us to detect and analyse middleboxes from
multiple aspects.
Aryan et al. presented a network measurement about Internet censorship in Iran [33]. In this
paper, the researchers investigated technical mechanisms and mapped the network topology of
censorship infrastructure. This work highlights the fact that censorship in Iran relies heavily on
centralized equipments (middleboxes). The main mechanisms which are used for censoring in
Iran are IP filtering, DNS NXDOMAIN packet injection, DNS hijacking, HTTP warning page
injection and TCP connection throttling.
Great Firewall of China (GFC) is a well-known middlebox system, featuring IP blocking, key-
word filtering, DNS hijacking and so on [16]. Different from other detection work, Xu et al. [20]
explored the location of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) devices of GFC placed for keyword
filtering as AS and router level. The algorithm of this work was sending probe packets that
contain known blacklist keywords with increasing TTL values. As opposed to previous work,
the researchers did not use top websites as targeted servers, the selected servers from diverse
provinces in China to find more filtering devices.
In short, this work gives an explanation of China’s AS-level Internet topology. ASes in this
work are categorized into two types, one is border AS which is directly peered with foreign
ones, the others is internal AS. Not surprisingly, findings show that most of filtering devices
belong to border ASes expect two internal filtering interfaces. These findings state the middlebox
distribution in network topology, and provide better understanding for Chinese national-scale
intrusion detection system.
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Internet has changed significantly now. For example, the increasing personalization of web ser-
vice has led to a number of clients and servers adopting HTTPS [34]. The work [34] is a study
of HTTPS which categorizes and quantifies the cost of ’S’ in HTTPS. By collecting data from
large ISPs, this work claims that 50% of web traffic flows today are secure. In other words,
HTTPS is widely used in web services. However, encryption provides confidentiality and au-
thentication to end users, but it renders all transparent and explicit middleboxes (e.g. web proxy,
DPI) ineffective at the same time. Moreover, HTTPS affects the protocol-related performance for
applications, e.g., increasing latency, negative impact on battery life. To manage the trade off be-
tween security and network functions on the path, we need to detect and understand middleboxes
firstly.
In this section, we describe and review prior work which introduces the detecting methods of
middleboxes. As shown in Table 2.1, we summary and compare detecting methods with dif-
ferent criteria. In brief, The work ( [35, 10, 13]) detected middlebox interference on IP and
TCP protocols in different kinds of networks, especially illustrated packet header modifications
in each layer. The one [7] employed a range of detectors at transport and application layers for
identifying proxies specifically. The new tools of middlebox detection were also designed, and
implemented in both computer [5] and mobile device versions [36].
2.3.1 Interactions Between Transport Protocols and Middleboxes
The first detailed analysis of interactions between protocols (especially transport protocols) and
middleboxes was published in 2004 [35]. The researchers used active measurement to assess
the behaviour of middleboxes, illustrated the fact that performance of protocol mechanisms in
Internet was quite different from theory.
This work used and extended the methodology from prior work [37] on TCP Behaviour Inference
Tool (TBIT). TBIT is a tool that characterizes TCP behaviour of a remote web server. TBIT
establishes a TCP connection with remote host, uses raw IP sockets to send segments, and sets
up BSD filter to deliver incoming packets to TBIT analysing process. However, the detecting
process of TBIT is limited by network conditions to some degree. For instance, the packet losses
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may lead the test wrongly reported. In this work, the researchers took each test specifically, and
used large set of web servers to make tests as robust as possible. In the section of results, this
work detected middlebox interference on Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN), Path MTU
Discovery, IP options, TCP options, and examined whether all of these headers could be used
safely.
As the first work to measure middlebox interference, this work makes a positive beginning to
understand behaviour and effect of middleboxes on basic TCP headers (emphasizing the end-to-
end network principle is broken). While, it leaves an open question that how middleboxes affect
the performance of transport protocols or applications. More active tests with application traffic
flows may be useful to investigate other middlebox interference.
2.3.2 Middlebox Interference on TCP Extensions
In 2011, Honda et al. [13] developed a tool ( TCPExposure) made of a client and a server to
determine whether middleboxes affect the performance of TCP option headers across diverse
networks. In particular, this work clarifies the limitations on TCP extensions imposed by mid-
dleboxes, discusses some questions about TCP options in real network. For example, what will
and will not pass through middleboxes, whether there are modifications in TCP option headers
or how middleboxes affect the transmission of TCP flows.
To answer these questions, the researchers conducted a study from 142 networks in 24 countries,
including cellular, WiFi and wired networks.
The initiator (acting like a TCP client) and the responder (a TCP server) run tests to trigger
on-path middlebox interference. The initiator transmitted crafted segments that included bytes
indicating commands in their payloads. The responder replied with a segment contains both
received and returned headers in payloads for identifying manipulations. Additionally, the gen-
erated traffic flows were mimicked with new TCP extensions, and examined destination ports
were varied.
As a summary, this work gives an example to measure middlebox impact on TCP options sys-
tematically. First, it examines the middlebox interference on TCP layer across diverse networks
(public, private, residential, commercial and academic networks). The satisfying conclusions are
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middleboxes are widely used for implementing functions for network layer, and middleboxes
do not affect the use of TCP options. Second, the idea of controlling both ends of the path
is significant for middlebox detection, as it provides the access to generate, track and analyse
traffic flows. Final, it guides the future design of TCP extensions, attracting the attentions of
researchers to think about compatibility of middleboxes in network deployment. However, there
are some other details needed to be discussed. Since main mimicked traffic flows in experiment
were SYN/SYNACK TCP segments, this method could not detect the middlebox interference
on performance of applications. Differently, the tool HICCUPS([38]) integrated middlebox de-
tection into common TCP connection process and presented relative tests with application layer
payloads. In addition, middleboxes interfere with different protocols. It is better to create a
high-level taxonomy of the testing tool, not only be used for specific protocols.
2.3.3 Middlebox Detection in Cellular Network
Today’s growing cellular traffic demand leads to great challenges for cellular network carriers to
provide users good network performance, and protect mobile devices from potential attacks [10].
The goal of this study is to gain insight into middleboxes’ policies, specific NAT and firewall in
cellular networks, and make targeted improvement for mobile applications.
In methodology part, the data was collected from about 400 users in 107 carriers across 6 conti-
nents. Researchers introduced NetPiculet, a tool comprised of client software running on mobile
devices inside cellular networks and a dedicated server in Internet. The client and server sent
end-to-end probes to infer middleboxes’ policies and quantify their impact based on traces.
This work is the first large-scale system that effectively discovers cellular network policies. It il-
lustrates a diversity of NAT and firewall polices and explains important implications for network
carriers as well as mobile application developers. It provides methodologies and results to under-
stand NAT and firewall in cellular network. However, although the target of this work is to detect
middleboxes, the detected policies only cover NAT and firewall in cellular network. Middleboxes
are much more complex and diverse, and therefore require considering wider interactions.
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2.3.4 Proxy Detection
As an extensive measurement of Netalyzr, the work [7] presented the results of experiment prob-
ing for presence of web proxies by establishing HTTP connections from end-user browsers to
custom web servers under researchers’ control. Running Netalyzr, 14% of clients show evidence
of HTTP proxying through one or more tests.
The Netalyzr tool uses a java applet to drive the bulk of test communication with their pro-
grammed servers. A Java applet is typically embedded inside a web page and runs in the context
of a browser [39]. Precisely, java applets run automatically within most major web browsers, en-
gage in raw TCP and UDP flows to arbitrary port and come with intrinsic security guarantees for
users. These advantages provide sufficient flexibility to conduct measurement tests and a simple
enough interface for unsophisticated users run it (giving access to a much larger user population).
When the user visits Netalyzr website, browser downloads and executes the applet. The applet
conducts test connections to various measurement servers. Test results and raw network traffic
traces in servers are stored for later analysis.
More specifically, this work detected web proxies based on two main strategies: TCP termination
and packet rewriting. A proxy employing TCP termination separates TCP connection with the
controlled server, relaying the content stream from both endpoints. To indicate the presence of
a TCP-terminating proxy, they used non-responsive server to send a RST packet to all incoming
requests. If Netalyzr clients make a connection on port 80 successfully, it provides evidence
that there is a TCP-terminating proxy on path. On the other hand, a packet-rewriting proxy may
modify traffic or inject additional traffic as flows through it. By checking the received HTTP
responses, modifications in HTTP headers, HTML documents and transfer encoding in a manner
can presence the packet-rewriting proxy.
In addition, this work added a new test to point the location of TCP-terminating proxy. For
any port on which previous test flagged the presence of a terminating proxy, Netalyzr client
attempted a TCP connection to a traceroute server which conducted a traceroute to respond
client using SYN-ACK packets. The traceroute terminated upon receiving TCP handshake’s
pure ACK, rather than an ICMP ”TTL exceeded” response. The hop which returned last ICMP
time-exceeded reply is the closest hop near the TCP-terminated middleboxes.
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Furthermore, the researchers repeated requests with different cache-control headers to check
and compare the received contents, detecting the behaviours of caching, transcoding and other
performance of HTTP.
As a summary, this work detects the presence of proxies, identifies the functions, and introduces
a TCP-terminating proxy location technique based on traceroute. However, the detection of this
work is based on TCP termination and packet manipulation. It is hard to detect transparent proxy
which does not open a new connection or modify packet contents. Making use of traceroute
is a key contribution to locate proxies, but the locating method in this work is only designed
for TCP-terminating proxy. In fact, the locating method only works for transport layer. At
the country level, they find that some use proxies for nation-wide censorship, such as Bahrain,
Singapore, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and so on. Although it could be evidence to prove
the Internet censorship is used in these countries, only controlling server side and focusing on
behaviour of proxies are not enough to explain the Internet censorship accurately. Overall, this
work is a empirical study of web proxy, while we need more general methodologies to detect and
locate all kinds of middleboxes.
2.3.5 Traceroute-style Detecting Tool
Detal et al. proposed tracebox [5], an extension of the traceroute tool, that is capable of detecting
middlebox interference. Same with traceroute, tracebox sends probes with increasing TTL values
and waiting for ICMP time-exceeded replies. Differently, traceroute uses quoted packet inside of
ICMP replies to identify intermediate routers, tracebox uses it to infer modifications applied on
probes by intermediate middleboxes and pinpoint where a given modification takes place. The
researchers deployed tracebox on PlanetLab [40], using 72 machines as vantage points. Each
vantage point had a target list of 5000 domains built with top 5,000 Alexa web sites. They
found some vantage points removed or changed TCP options at the very first hop. Also, the
modification of TCP sequence number occurred on the path of two experiment cases.
In brief, it is a key contribution of making use of ICMP time-exceeded replies to detect and
locate middleboxes. However, detecting methods are limited by the types of ICMP replies. When
IPv4 router receives an IPv4 packet whose TTL is going to expire, it returns an ICMPv4 time-
exceeded message that contains offending packets. According to RFC792, the returned ICMP
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packet should quote the IP header of original packet and the first 64 bits of payload of this
packet [41]. Different with this, RFC1812 [42] recommends to quote the entire IP packet in the
returned ICMP, but this recommendation has only been implemented on some routers. When
tracebox receives ICMP replies with full quoted original packet, it is able to detect any changes
in each layer. From the result of PlanetLab use case, the number of router that replies with a full
ICMP is too few to cover all paths.
On the other hand, the presence of middleboxes is inferred only by packet modification. As we
mentioned before, the behaviour of middleboxes and application traffic flows are both complex.
The interference could not only be modification, but also filtering or injection. Tracebox could
detect the modification of bytes in each packet, but it is not enough for detecting other middle-
box interference. In addition, lacking of controlling in server side, tracebox merely explores
modification performed by upstream middleboxes.
TraceboxAndroid [36] is a proof-of-concept measurement application for Android mobile de-
vices implementing the tracebox algorithm. It is a tool for smartphones to infer middlebox be-
haviour in WiFi and cellular networks. Although this tool has same limitations as tracebox,
the results list more impact and understanding of mobile devices (e.g. middlebox TCP option
blocking).
Craven et al. proposed TCP HICCUPS [38] in 2014 to reveal packet header manipulation (spe-
cific for TCP header) to both sides of a TCP connection. To detect modifications, HICCUPS
hashed packet headers and spread the resulting hash into three fields of the original headers (in
case a change to any header field). Running HICCUPS across a distributed and diversity set of
paths, the researchers discovered a wide variety of behaviours in both forwarding and receiving
directions, but as displayed in the tool name, it purely works for TCP traffic flows.
2.4 Summary and Discussion
As a summary, we explain the definition of middlebox, illustrate the reasons that why we care
about middleboxes, and discuss existing detecting methods in prior work. Middleboxes are inter-
mediary devices that performing new network functions other than forwarding packets. While,
the insertion of middleboxes brings new challenges, such as compatibility of protocols, privacy
2.4. Summary and Discussion 17
of network traffic and so on. On the other hand, middleboxes are extensively deployed for secu-
rity and performance enhancement in networks, and interfere with traffic flows in varied ways.
All of these reveal that middleboxes are important in current Internet and affect the behaviour of
applications, then methodologies are needed to detect and measure them.
Table 2.1: Detecting Method Comparison
Method Client Root Access Server Root Access Locating Support Protocols Multiple Interference
TBIT [35] X × × IP,TCP ×
TcpExposure [13] X X × IP,TCP X
NetPiculet [10] X X × IP,TCP X
Netalyzr [7] × X X HTTP ×
Tracebox [5] X × X IP,TCP ×
HICCUPS [38] X X × IP,TCP ×
As shown in Table 2.1, we discuss prior methodologies from different aspects. Learnt from them
and achieve our own motivations, we propose our methodologies in three parts. First, both end
hosts should be controlled for generating, capturing, and analysing traffic flows. Second, client
and server are programmed for working as applications, the traffic flows should contain payloads
of application layers. Last, detecting methods are based on different interference of middleboxes




Our work aims to detect and locate the behaviour of middleboxes, especially measuring the
middlebox interference on applications. In this chapter, we explain the methodologies of our
work conscientiously.
Our methods adopt a client-server architecture, allowing to generate probe packets from clients
and servers, compare the expected traffic exchanged between end hosts and the one actually re-
ceived (Section 3.1). Also, we describe three types of middlebox interference, illustrating the
detecting process with controlling of both end hosts (Section 3.2). Different with prior work,
our probe packets are crafted with application layer payloads that attempt to expose middlebox
interference with application traffic flows. In Section 3.3, we describe our application probes,
explaining the process of samples. As followed, we describe our traceroute-like probing with in-
creasing TTL values, illustrating how to locate the approximate position range of the interfering
middlebox by these methods. Finally, we describe how to adopt our methodologies with Lumi-
nati, the commercial Peer-to-Peer (P2P)-based HTTP/S proxy service, launching crafted HTTP
requests across all over the world.
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3.1 Client-Server Architecture
Our methods control both client and server sides, making use of root access to generate, capture
and compare traffic flows. As shown in Figure 3.1, we treat the middlebox as a black box, and
detect the interference by checking the differences between exchanged traffic flows and original
probes. Client-server architecture provides visibility of the network between end hosts, observ-
ing the difference between upstream and downstream traffic. Different from bit modification
detection, e.g. tracebox [5], our end hosts are programmable to generate probes from varied lay-
ers, make connections, and respond to queries as running real applications. Filtering, injection,
and modification are inferred by comparing the traces from client and server.
The code of client makes up of lots of bash commands to make connection, send queries and
capture traces at the same time. It is compatible to run from terminals of the Linux system
machines. Based on multiple application layer protocols, the server listens on particular ports
and returns responses as the format of varied application servers, such as DNS resolver, web
server and so on.
Figure 3.1: Client-Server Architecture
3.2 Detecting Process
Our methods detect three types of interference: filtering, injection and modification. In this sub-
section, we describe the interference with different use cases, explain the process of detection and
implementation with diagrams, and finally discuss how to identify the interference by analysing
captured traces.
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3.2.1 Filtering
Theoretically, one end host should receive the original probes from source host. If not, the probe
may have been lost or filtered by some middleboxes. As shown in Figure 3.2, the middlebox
drops the packets for purpose when packets go through it.
Figure 3.2: Diagram for Filtering
A firewall is an important example of network middleboxes that filters traffic flows for network
security and network control. Nowdays, there are three types of use cases for filtering. First, fire-
walls or any other middleboxes drop packets based on IP addresses and TCP ports. As described
in prior chapter, IP or port blocking is the earliest filtering mechanism and used for Internet
censorship in China, Brazil and so on [20, 43, 11].
Second, middleboxes operate up to the transport layer of OSI model, the state of connection is
used for making judgements for filtering. In principle, this kind of filtering should follow the
policies of TCP. However, as observed in the work [10], the stateful firewall policies in some
cellular networks usually do not strictly follow the TCP specification.
Furthermore, middleboxes also operate filtering in application layer. The triggers of filtering
are inside payloads of application layer and middleboxes need understand the applications and
related protocols. For example, URL filtering and keyword filtering are achieved by checking
application payloads (e.g. HTTP request target, content of HTTP response), implementing Inter-
net censorship, copyright protection and other web traffic control. In addition, middleboxes are
getting ”wider” or ”deeper” inspection at application stack [44]. For instance, intrusion detection
system (IDS) are developed in today’s network for malicious activity or policy violations.
In our work, we control both client and server sides, we detect the filtering by mapping the
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original probes and received packets. To take into account the effect of random packet loss, we
send the probes several times, repeating the experiments for multiple samples. Also, we send
probes that do not attempt to trigger middlebox interference to verify that the exposed middlebox
behaviour is indeed caused by specific payloads.
3.2.2 Injection
Figure 3.3: Diagram for Injection
As shown in Figure 3.3, middleboxes may inject fake packets to end hosts with spoofed source IP
addresses. The injected packets usually interferes with network connection for blocking, affect-
ing the performance of applications. For example, GFC returns forged DNS responses to clients
for blocking some blacklisted websites, causing collateral damage and affecting communication
beyond the censored networks when outside DNS traffic traverses censored links [14]. Moreover,
forged TCP RST packets are deployed by some ISPs to manage P2P traffic, as well as by GFC
to censor communication of in and out traffic flows [45]. Also, some organizations insert HTTP
response with warning html page to notice clients the network filtering or network control.
The injected packets are crafted by middleboxes. The source IP addresses are forged with the
destination IP of original probes, pretending the standard communication with end hosts. We
compare the traces from both end hosts, finding the extra packets which are not sent from end
hosts, but injected by middleboxes. Indeed, some middleboxes inject HTTP response with warn-
ing html page payload to notice the client about the traffic filtering. Since we control client and
server, we could infer the filtering and injection at the same time, exposing the full process of
middlebox interference.
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3.2.3 Modification
Packet manipulation is a main kind of middlebox interference for shaping traffic flows. Middle-
boxes may remove headers in different layers, inject new headers to carry more information of
middleboxes or connection, modify the value of headers and response payloads for new func-
tions.
Figure 3.4: Diagram for Modification
We find lots of examples for packet manipulation in today’s network. First, some middleboxes
manipulate the IP and TCP headers, affecting the compatibility between middleboxes and net-
work protocols. For example, the study [13] developed a measurement methodology to evaluate
middlebox behaviour relating to TCP headers, especially for TCP extensions. From the results,
we are warned that do not assume sequence numbers arrive unmodified, which will affect the
performance of TCP option or TCP connection. In addition, proxies are common in today’s
networks, and strips TCP options in different ASes.
Second, by manipulating the headers and contents of application traffic flows across regions and
networks, more communication meta and user’s private information are exposed and tracked
through middleboxes [46].
Furthermore, the Chinese censorship inserts additional attacking scripts to outgoing HTTP re-
sponses, engineering a denial-of-service attack on GreatFire.org, an organization dedicated to
resisting China’s censorship [16]. By making use of packet manipulation, Chinese government
turns GFC into a weapon (China’s Great Cannon) which coopts arbitrary computers outside of
China to achieve Chinese policies.
To detect the modification in each packet, we decode the traces as each protocol defined, compar-
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ing the difference between original probes and received packets from clients and servers. Also,
by correlating the different types of modifications, we could infer the presence of middleboxes,
explore the functions and effects of these middleboxes in varied networks.
3.3 Probe
3.3.1 HTTP Probe
World Wide Web (WWW) is accessed through HTTP, dictating the format of exchanging web
contents. Since HTTP provides a vital infrastructure for users exchanging information and com-
municating with each other, it has changed Internet significantly.
Currently, the implementation of HTTP is diverse: the user agents of HTTP traffic are not only
the general-purpose browsers, but also other household appliances, command-line programs, mo-
bile applications and so on. Likewise, common HTTP original servers are not only large public
websites, but also other home automation units, configurable networking components, office ma-
chines, advertisement selectors, third party servers and video-delivery platforms [47]. Moreover,
lots of middleboxes interact with HTTP traffic, serving numerous roles, from performance en-
hancement to access control to network censorship [7]. Therefore, we craft our probes as HTTP
messages, simulate the work process of HTTP for detecting related middlebox interference.
Theoretically, a HTTP message consists of a message header and an optional message body,
separated by a blank line [48]. As shown in Figure 3.5, the message header of HTTP request
contains request line and request headers [49]. The request line includes the request method,
URL link and the version of HTTP. As discussed in Section 3.2, these contents of HTTP requests
contain information about traffic flows, and may be triggers of some middlebox interference.
Also, HTTP response contains the status line and other response headers. In general, HTTP
request/response headers are used to pass additional communicate meta information between
clients and servers. The headers are classified by their usage category, such as authentication,
cache, client hints, conditionals and so on, representing the related functions of middleboxes. At
the same time, the HTTP payload constitutes the content of the message, returning the queried
documents.
In our method, the client makes TCP connection with our owned server firstly. After making
3.3. Probe 24
Figure 3.5: HTTP Message Format
TCP connection successful, the client sends HTTP request, the server returns HTTP response to
client as followed. By making the TCP connection, we could achieve the full process of sending
and responding HTTP messages, which may trigger more middlebox interference about state.
For instance, application-layer filter is a kind of stateful middleboxes. It typically operates on
live TCP connections. Instead of filtering all packets directly, the end hosts are allowed to make
TCP connections. After examining the payloads of application traffic flows, the application-layer
middlebox filters traffic flows or terminates live TCP connections by related policies and states.
At the client side, we launch HTTP requests by using the command-line program curl. Three
default request headers are issued: Host, User-Agent and Accept. To detect the behaviour of
middleboxes for implementing Internet censorship, we craft the value of ”Host” header with
blacklisted domain names (Table 3.1). For our own server, we instantiate the server in Amazon
EC2 instance, using the default Apache configuration with the exception of disabling all caching
(using the Cache-Control header). To avoid ethical issue, the payload of HTTP response is a
simple ”Hello World” HTML page (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.6: Detecting Process of HTTP Traffic Flows
The analysing process is based on the captured traces. We compare the traffic flows with traces
from client and server sides, checking the filtering and modification of HTTP request and re-
sponse. At the same time, we detect TCP reset packet injection or other interference about
connection state by finding the additional TCP reset packets from middleboxes.
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Figure 3.7: The Source Code of HTML Page in HTTP Response
3.3.2 TLS probe
Security is more and more important on the Internet [50]. TLS and SSL are cryptographic pro-
tocols that provide means for achieving security at the transport layer [51, 52]. Currently, TLS
is the most widely used as the secure transport layer below HTTP, running the secure version of
HTTP, HTTPS [50, 34]. A large number of websites, such as Gmail, Facebook or even YouTube
use TLS as the secure transport layer to transmit encrypted data to protect the user information,
for example, 50% of YouTube streaming flows are over HTTPS [34]. Furthermore, some mid-
dleboxes today operate TLS/SSL traffic [53], performing ”man in the middle” (attack) on the
connection for Internet censorship purpose [54, 55, 56]. We use the TLS handshake message to
detect whether there is fake certificate injection or any other interference on TLS traffic flows.
Figure 3.8: The Process of TLS Handshake
Each TLS connection begins with a handshake between client and server. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.8, the client asks the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) suite from the authenticated server
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and generates cryptographic keys to create a secure channel for encrypted data transmission.
Figure 3.9: Detecting Process of TLS Traffic Flows
In theory, TLS negotiation [57] includes four steps. First, client sends a ”Client Hello” message
to list cryptographic information for the server. Then, server responds to client with a ”Server
Hello” message which returns the server’s certificate. Getting the public key from the server’s
certificate, the client creates a random Pre-Master Secret. Based on the Pre-Master Secret, the
server and client generate the new session keys for encrypting application data. If any middlebox
modifies or injects fake certificate or key on the path, the handshake will fail and the transmission
will not safe any more. As mentioned in [25], because of TLS and HTTPS, all network func-
tionalities must reside at the endpoints. However, it may be not optimal or even possible for the
networks with middleboxes. In order to understand the behaviour of middleboxes on encrypted
data, we plan to measure how middleboxes interfere with TLS traffic flows firstly.
To check the process of TLS negotiation, our client sends a ”Client Hello” message to our con-
trolled server (Figure 3.9). The server listens on port 443 to wait for the TLS handshake message.
The server does not respond the handshake message, any received TLS handshake message in
client side is injected by middleboxes. Since the extension section in Client Hello Message has
the Server Name field, we craft it with our blacklisted host names to check any middlebox inter-
ference which is related to Internet censorship.
3.3.3 DNS Probe
Currently, DNS is the most widely used service on the Internet [58]. In theory, most of Internet
devices make connection and access websites based on IP addresses. While, it is quite harder for
users to remember the exact IP address than the name of a website. DNS provides the function
of converting domain name to IP address. Before connecting to a website, users need resolve do-
main name to IP address by accessing DNS. DNS is the fundamental step for end users accessing
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web-hosting services, and affects the performance of many Internet applications.
In general, end user firstly sends DNS query to a resolver, which may be operated by their ISP,
wireless carrier or other third party providers. If the resolver does not have the answer, the
resolver queries to root nameserver, TLD nameserver and authoritative DNS server to get the
DNS record. The resolver returns the DNS record to end user, and stores the record in its local
cache. If anyone else requests the same domain name again, and the TTL of the local cache is not
expired, the resolver will return the record to the user directly. Otherwise, the resolver will query
to the authoritative DNS server again. In other words, the resolver is important to DNS service for
returning response, the local cache in the resolver can become poisoned if it contains an incorrect
entry. For example, the GFC inspects DNS queries near the ISP’s boundary routers for sensitive
domain keywords and injecting forged DNS responses. Unfortunately, the local DNS resolver
saves incorrect caches and returns forged response to all queried users. The DNS requests are
not only from inside censored networks, but also from outside censored network. The injected
forged responses affect communication beyond the censored networks when outside DNS traffic
traverses censored links, causing large scale collateral damage across the world [14, 59].
Figure 3.10: Detecting Process of DNS Traffic Flows
In our method, we set up a DNS proxy server to capture, compare the DNS queries and responses
to detect middlebox interference on DNS traffic flows. Figure 3.10 shows the process of our
detection. Instead of querying to ISP DNS resolver, our client queries to our own controlled
DNS proxy server which is running in Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance [60].
Our DNS proxy server forwards DNS query to Google public DNS service to get the correct
DNS response which returns actual IP addresses for the queried domain name. To defend against
spoofing attacks that can ”poison” a name server’s cache and return malicious IP address, Google
has implemented several recommended solutions to help guarantee the authenticity of the re-
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sponses [61]. At last, our DNS proxy server returns correct response to our clients. The client
and DNS proxy server are both controlled, the analysis is based on decoding and comparing
traces from both sides.
Figure 3.11: DNS Message Format
Figure 3.12: A Small Ethernet II Frame Contains DNS message
As shown in Figure 3.12, DNS protocol uses UDP as transport layer protocol because of its small
overhead. Without making connection firstly, UDP is much faster than TCP. The DNS message
could be divided into five sections: DNS header, the question for the name server, the answer
for the query, the records for authoritative server and additional information that may be used
(Figure 3.11).
DNS header contains 12 bytes in total, assigning an identifier for the DNS message as DNS
ID; specifying which of the remaining sections are present, whether the message is a query or
a response, a standard query or other type query in flags; pointing out the number of question
and answer entries. We use DNS ID to map the original query and received query, and detect the
packet filtering or manipulation by comparing captured traces.
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Different with DNS response, DNS query only has question section. Question section contains
three fields: the queried domain name, type of the query and the class of query. In our method,
we use type A query to resolve the IPv4 address into domain name.
The answer, authority, and addition sections all share the same resource record format [62, 63].
Each resource record contains the domain name for this resource record, the type and class of
resource record, and the time duration that resource record may be cached. Fake responses with
spoofed resource records may be injected to the user, and the resolved IP address in the resource
record may be modified [59]. We decode the traces as DNS protocol, and compare each field to
identify the interference.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the queried domain name in DNS protocol is the trigger for mid-
dlebox interference. In details, we select 47 host names (Table 3.1) to craft different DNS queries,
triggering the packet filtering or packet injection, especially the behaviour of middleboxes which
are related to Internet censorship, copyright protection, and network security. The host names
are listed from Internet censorship paper ([64, 11]) and online news about blocked websites in























Table 3.1: Blacklist of Host Names
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In our early work, we implemented the methods of DNS probes in PlanetLab platform [40]. Our
methods detected two types of foged DNS responses and the corresponding results confirmed the
interference of injection, as reported in prior work [14, 69]. Limited by the number of available
instances in PlanetLab, our detection results about DNS-interacting middleboxes are all related
to GFC, which has been already studied in prior work [14, 69, 11, 64]
3.4 Middlebox Locating
Currently, middleboxes are located by probing with different TTL values. As mentioned in
tracebox methodology [5], when an IPv4 router receives an IPv4 packet whose TTL is going to
expire, it returns an ICMPv4 time-exceeded reply contain the offending packet. The differences
between original probes and offending packets reveal the behaviour of middleboxes on the path.
3.4.1 Locating Three Types of Middlebox Interference
Inspired by tracebox, we develop traceroute-like locating methods with our client-server archi-
tecture, comparing the original probe, the quoted offending packet in the returned ICMP time-
exceeded reply and the received one in server side, inferring the approximate hop range of three
types of middlebox interference. While, some routes do not return ICMP time-exceeded replies.
Also, some middleboxes modify or filter the replies again. Using our methods which control both
client and server sides is essential to locate varied interference. In this subsection, we explain
how to locate three types of middlebox interference specifically. Furthermore, we discuss the
limitation of locating in next subsection 3.4.2.
Figure 3.13: Locating Process of Packet Filtering
3.4. Middlebox Locating 31
As shown in Figure 3.13, the probes are sent with increasing TTL values. The client receives
multiple ICMP time-exceeded replies to describe the path. However, after the middlebox filters
the original probes, the received ICMP time-exceeded replies could not cover the whole path
between client and server. The last hop in described path is the approximate location of where a
given filtering takes place.
Figure 3.14: Locating Process of Packet Injection
The probes with small TTL values will not trigger the injection packet (shown in Figure 3.14).
From the received ICMP time-exceeded replies and injected packets, we identify the last hop
before the probe triggers injected packet. At the same time, we could identify the first hop after
the probe passes though middleboxes and triggers injected packet. These two hops describe the
approximate location of middleboxes.
Figure 3.15: Locating Process of Packet Modification
If the original probe is modified by middleboxes, the offending packet inside the ICMP time-
exceeded replies are different. We locate the range of middlebox by checking each received
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ICMP time-exceeded replies, discovering the involved networks deeper and deeper.
3.4.2 Discussion
To locate the middlebox, we check each quoted packets in ICMP time-exceeded replies, and
point out the last hop before modification and the first hop after crossing the middlebox. However,
these traceroute-like locating methods are limited with the received ICMP time-exceeded replies.
First, some routers do not return the ICMP time-exceeded replies, especially inside private net-
work. The distance between middleboxes and identified location may be more than one hop.
Second, the type of returned ICMP reply affects our identification. According to RFC792 [41],
the returned ICMP time-exceeded reply should quote the IP header and the next eight bytes of
original packet. RFC1812 [42] suggests to quote the entire IP packet in ICMP time-exceeded
reply, but this recommendation has not been widely implemented. The more contents of original
probes quoted in the ICMP replies, the more interference we could locate.
At last, as we discussed before, middleboxes are complex. There may be multiple middleboxes
between two routers. With our methods, we could figure out the hop range of middleboxes from
upstream and downstream directions, trying to identify the types of involved networks, but, it is
hard to point out the accurate number and location of each middlebox .
3.5 Methodology with Luminati
Since we aim to measuring vantage points in different networks across the world, we implement
our methodology with Luminati, based on the Hola network, to launch HTTP requests across the
Internet. In this section, we describe how to develop our methodology with Luminati platform,
detecting the presence of middleboxes through their interaction with HTTP requests and answers.
We keep adopting the client-server architecture, with control on both sides of the end-to-end
flow. All probes sent and received are collected and kept for further analysis. Note that the detail
description of our client-server methodology has been described in Section 3.1.
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3.5.1 Hola and Luminati
Hola is a P2P VPN service, which allows users to route traffic over a large number of country
peers, from nearly 280 countries. These country peers run on users’ machines, therefore based
on a variety of devices, e.g., laptops, mobile devices, and distributed across various types of
networks. In practice however, Hola forwards traffic via super proxies located in a few countries
(e.g., the UK or the USA), instead of going though each country peer.
To get full advantage of the vantage points from the Hola proxy network, one needs to rely
on Luminati. Luminati is a paid HTTP/S service that is based on the Hola network. Luminati
forwards users’ traffic via Hola country peers, not the specific super proxy, therefore providing a
much larger set of vantage points from which to launch probes. Furthermore, Luminati enables
users to select country peers in the Hola network. For instance, the Luminati users could launch
multiple requests from same country peer by adding the same -session-number parameter to
their subsequent requests. The session number could be a random number, and Luminati will
keep forwarding the subsequent requests via the same country peer, for a period of 60 seconds
only. After these 60 seconds, Luminati chooses another country peer, potentially different from
the prior one. Also, even though in principle a country peer from the chosen country will be used,
there is no guarantee that this is actually going to be the case.
In the received HTTP responses, Luminati super proxies add two headers, for logging and de-
bugging the selected country peer (X-Hola-Timeline-Debug and X-Hola-Unblocker-Debug),
carrying the identifier zID for the selected country peer. By recording the zID, we can check
whether our probes are forwarded via the same country peer, even if the country peer has changed
its IP address in the meantime.
3.5.2 Measurement Methodology
3.5.2.1 Available Country Peers
Although Luminati provides diverse country peers across the Internet, a user is only able to select
country peers at the granularity of an AS or a country, without indication about the network type
inside which the country peer is. Luminati does not enable a controlled selection of the ingress
nodes, and selects the available country peers randomly. As we aim to probe from as many
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networks as possible in our measurements, we launch HTTP requests via as many as possible
country peers. For each country among the 275 available countries of the measurements, we
keep sending probes using random session numbers.
Figure 3.16: Sample Request of Luminati.
Figure 3.16 shows the shell scripts to launch HTTP requests with Luminati. The parame-
ter zproxy.luminati.io could be replace by the IP address of one particular super proxy, and the
port number is fixed (22225). The country code parameter (CC) and the random session num-
ber are used for selecting available country peers in different countries and separating country
sources of traffic. More examples which explain how to work with Luminati in Java, Python,
Ruby and Perl are displayed on the official website [70].
We launch sets of 500 requests for a given country at a time. If for a given country, after a set of
500 requests, we observe 5 duplicate country peers, we stop probing this country for a while1.
3.5.2.2 DNS resolution
In principle, Luminati allows users to set the DNS resolution by adding the -dns-remote parame-
ter to the request. This DNS resolution can be done at two different places. The first place where
the DNS resolution can be done is at the super proxies, which send the DNS query to Google’s
public DNS service. The second place is at the country peer, which sends the DNS query to
its local DNS resolver. To ensure that our probes are forwarded by country peers, and not the
super proxies, we forward the original HTTP GET request directly to the country peer, and ask
for the DNS resolution to be also done by the country peer. Figure 3.17 illustrates the process of
launching HTTP requests using the Luminati platform. For all requests, we select the same super
proxy from the United Kingdom, using all available country peers.
3.5.2.3 Crafted Probes and Answers
With our methodology, we control both the client and server sides, sending crafted probes (HTTP
requests) and responses (HTTP responses). Unfortunately, Luminati does not provide direct ac-
1But we guarantee that we launch a total of 1000 requests in any given country in our measurements,
even if a single country peer is available.
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Figure 3.17: Luminati-based Probing Methodology.
cess to the country peers for probes to be sent, but only allows requests to be forwarded through
them. Figure 3.18 shows the traffic exchange process between country peers and our controlled
server. We treat country peers as our original clients, and detect middlebox interference on the
path between the country peer and the server. As shown in Figure 3.18, the actual origin of the
probes is one of the available Luminati country peers acting as client, and the target of the probes
is a server under our control, located in Ireland Amazon cloud data center, running the server-side
of our methodology.
Figure 3.18: Traffic Flow between Country Peer and Target Server.
We set up measurement clients, operating in Amazon cloud instances in Ireland. We launch
HTTP requests to our target server, via the Luminati country peers2, with 7 default request head-
ers: Host, User-Agent, Accept, Accept-Charset, Accept-Encoding, Keep-Alive and Connection.
2As we rely on the Luminati proxy peers, the location of the clients is technically irrelevant for the
middlebox detection.
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Date Mon, 15 Aug 2016 16:59:35 GMT
Etag 90-52ecccfbb0285
Content-Length 144
Last-Modified Thu, 24 Mar 2016 15:07:56 GMT
Server Apache/2.4.6 (Red Hat Enterprise Linux)
The default values of these headers are shown in Table 3.2.
In Figure 3.19, we show the sample script of launching HTTP requests from client side. As
described before, the requests are fowarded to super proxies firstly. We choose to do the DNS
resolution by country peers and insert the parameter -dns-remote in the requests. The default
HTTP headers are setted by parameter -H, which is the option of curl to specify HTTP headers.
Figure 3.19: Sample Request of Luminati.
Our target server is operating in an Amazon cloud instance, located in Ireland as well3. The
server acts as a standard Apache HTTP server, waits for the TCP connection and GET request,
and returns the HTTP response with a crafted payload. As we are forwarding requests through
3Only in the case of requests launched from country peers in Ireland, we rely on an Amazon cloud
instance in the US as target server to ensure our probes travel through the Internet, not inside the Amazon
infrastructure.
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other users’ machines, to avoid potential ethical problems for these users, we only respond to
requests with a simple ”Hello World” HTML page with 9 default response headers.
Figure 3.20: Sample Script of HTTP Server.
Figure 3.20 shows the sample python script which is operating in Amazon cloud instance. We
craft a sample payload of HTTP response in a text file in advance. After making the connection
successfully, we send the crafted response back to the client. In addition, we import the Scapy
library in the scripts for the next location step, sending the probes with increasing TTL values.
Although not every country peer would return us with a response, we compared all received
HTTP messages with the sent probes. As explained in Section 3.5.1, the super proxy of Luminati
adds two headers (X-Hola-Timeline-Debug and X-Hola-Unblocker-Debug) to HTTP response,
illustrating the information of selected country peer. These two headers do not affect or overwrite
other original headers. When comparing HTTP responses, we do not take these two headers into
consideration, but investigate other headers.
3.5.3 Locating Methodology with Luminati
Inspired by tracebox, we try to locate the involved middleboxes hop by hop. Since we can not
have access to Luminati country peers, our current process of probing is unidirectional, from
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Figure 3.21: Diagram of Probing with Increasing TTL Values
server to country peers (shown in Figure 3.21). The servers are both in Amazon cloud platform,
one is located in Ireland data center, the other is located in US for probing the country peers
distributed in Ireland.
In principle, the last hop which returns ICMP time-exceeded reply should be in the same AS of
country peers. Meanwhile, if the middleboxes are located near client side, the last ICMP reply
may also come from same AS of country peers. On the other hand, if the last ICMP reply comes
from different AS of country peer, we infer that there may be TCP-terminating middleboxes
between two end hosts, and the locations of middleboxes are in the middle or close to server
side.
Similar with our prior experiments, our probes are crafted with HTTP response payloads. To im-
plement the response with increasing TTL values, we develop our python scripts with the Scapy
library, and send our responses to the country peers directly (without making connections). To
mark the TTL value for each probe, we craft the IP identification in IP datagram with the same
value of its TTL.
3.6 Summary
Lacking the access to the network devices inside networks, it is very hard to have the visibility
to observe what happens in the middle. Our methods aim to mimic the transmission of traffic
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flows, describing the behaviour of middleboxes on the path, analysing middlebox interference
and locating the approximate location of involved middleboxes.
As discussed in Section 2.4 and Table 2.1, we learn and develop our methodology from prior
detecting methods. Inspired by TcpExposure, NetPiculet and HICCUPS, our methods control
both client and server sides, which allow to compare the traces between two end hosts (client
and server) at the same time. The difference between traces illustrates the middlebox interfer-
ence, explaining the effect on the state of connection, and how middlebox breaks the end-to-end
model. Differs from these three prior methods, our probe packets are crafted as our design, pro-
viding the freedom to launch different kinds of queries to mimic varies kinds of traffic flows. In
addition, we detect the packet manipulation in both direction (from client to server and server to
client) independently, avoiding multiple manipulation by the same middlebox. The tool Netalyzr
provides different types of network functionality tests, giving us lots of ideas about making large-
scale measurement. While, our detection is done by both upstream and downstream directions
with larger dataset. Tracebox is a traceroute-like tool to identify packet modifications performed
by upstream middleboxes. It is a seminal work in the area of middlebox interference. Our
methodology extends this work with application traffic flows, detecting middlebox interference
on applications, especially exploring the middlebox behaviour triggered by application payloads.
In addition, with the help of traceroute-like probing, we check the middlebox interference hop
by hop, locate the range of approximate position of middlebox, exploring the types of networks
inspected.
On the other hand, the process of locating middlebox depends on the returned ICMP time-
exceeded replies. As we discussed in Section 3.4.2, not all the routers return ICMP replies.
It is hard to describe each hop in the whole path. Also, some ICMP replies only quote the first
64 bits of original packets, which can not be used for detecting and locating the manipulation of
application layer payloads. Indeed, it is hard to point out the location where each interference




To sample middlebox interference across the Internet, we want the probes to be sent through a
physical infrastructure distributed across the world. However, the infrastructure used to send the
probes should provide significant and as representative as possible vantage points, i.e., beyond
a purely academic one such as PlanetLab. Indeed, PlanetLab is not suitable for our middlebox
study. Most of PlanetLab instances are distributed inside research labs with unrestricted Internet
access, and the usage of middleboxes in academic networks is limited. We have used our method-
ology on the PlanetLab infrastructure as well, but hardly found any middlebox interference this
way, only a few non-representative instances of middleboxes. Therefore, we use the commercial
Peer-to-Peer (P2P)-based HTTP/S proxy service, Luminati, based on the Hola network, to launch
HTTP requests across the Internet.
In this Chapter, we explain what we get by using Luminati platform to run large-scale measure-
ments (Section 4.1.1). Also, based on our analysis and results, we show evidence for a signif-
icant amount of middlebox interference on both directions of traffic flows in different kinds of
networks (Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.3). In addition, we investigate more information about
the location of involved middleboxes by launching traceroute-like probes (Section 4.2).
4.1. Middlebox Interference on HTTP Messages 41
4.1 Middlebox Interference on HTTP Messages
Middleboxes are widely used in today’s Internet, especially for security and performance. Mid-
dleboxes classify, filter and shape traffic, therefore interfering with application performance and
performing new network functions for end hosts. In this part of results, we provide evidence for
middleboxes deployed across more than 1000 ASes. We observe various middlebox interference
in both directions of traffic flows, and across a wide range networks, including mobile operators
and data center networks. In details, we examine middlebox interference on HTTP requests in
Section 4.1.2 and describe response manipulation in Section 4.1.3. Furthermore, for each type of
manipulation, we not only study the variety of headers affected, but also try to infer the type of
network in which the manipulations take place.
4.1.1 Dataset
We now give a brief introduction of our collected dataset. We kept launching requests through
different country peers for a period of 5 days, from September 29 until October 3 2016. Table 4.1
shows the number of the IP addresses seen through the requests and responses, their AS and
country. In Table 4.2, we investigate the AS coverage based on the classification provided by
Dimitropoulos et al. [71]. Despite the fine-grained nature of this classification, nearly 67% of
the ASes we observe are unclassified (last row of Table 4.2). Also, the classifier abstains from
classifying some ASes, when the information about them is not sufficient (labeled as ”Missing
Sufficient Information” in Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Overview of Dataset
Requests Responses
# of IPs 401,746 372,603
# of ASes 10,060 9,634
# of countries 196 196
For requests, we rely on the source IP address of the received request at the server. This IP
address will either be the one from the Luminati country peer or a TCP-terminating middlebox
located between the country peer and our server. Luminati adds the IP address of the selected
country peer to the response header, and therefore the IP address we use for the response in our
dataset is one of the selected country peers (not of a middlebox). All the corresponding ASes and
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Figure 4.1: Number of IP Addresses per Country (max 16433).
Figure 4.2: Number of ASes per Country (max 1200).




( # of ASes)
Customer 927 887
University 324 319
Internet Exchange 3 3
Network Information Center 43 43
Tier 1 39 38
Tier 2 1631 1611
Missing Sufficient Information 197 198
Unclassified 6896 6536
countries are inferred from these IP addresses. We provide the distribution of selected country
peers in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
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4.1.2 Request Header Injection
In the upstream direction, i.e., on the path the HTTP request takes towards the server, we see a
variety of new headers injected by middleboxes. These headers mostly relate to common network
functions, such as proxying, caching, filtering and load balancing. When comparing the injected
headers from the requests with those from responses, we see a wider diversity of different headers
being manipulated in responses. We also observe that most of the manipulated response headers
relate to proxies or caches that inject new headers into requests. Though the sheer numbers do
not constitute conclusive evidence, this may indicate that middleboxes affecting the upstream
direction (requests) are actually a subset of those affecting the downstream direction (responses).
Given that middleboxes are stateful devices that see both directions of the traffic flows, it is nat-
ural to expect a significant overlap between manipulations done in both directions of the traffic.
4.1.2.1 Proxies/Caches Request Header Injection
Table 4.3: Injected Request Headers Related to Proxy or Cache Functions.
Injected header # of ASes # of countries Note
Proxy-Related
Via 695 117 Via: 1.1 rcdn9-cd1-dmz-wsa-1.cisco.com:80
X-Forwarded-For 535 106 X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.2.157
X-Proxy-ID 178 58 X-Proxy-ID: 2004304525
X-IMForwards 30 20 X-IMForwards: 20
Max-Forwards 5 4 Max-Forwards: 10
Client-IP 5 7 Client-IP: 10.224.164.34
Client-ip 3 2 Client-ip: 192.168.23.5
X-BlueCoat-Via 49 9 X-BlueCoat-Via: fb09b83d12ade53b
CUDA CLIIP 19 11 CUDA CLIIP: 172.16.20.138
X-IWS-Via 7 6 X-IWS-Via: 1.1 51066FAS (IWSS)
X-IWSaaS-Via 1 1 X-IWSaaS-Via: 1.1 scannerdy-an-20-3012-a-pro-
18293387:8080 (IWSaaS)
X-RBT-Optimized-By 2 2 X-RBT-Optimized-By: LGEPS-PC-ACC-3070M-A
(RiOS 8.6.2c) SC
RVBD-CSH 1 1 RVBD-CSH: ::ffff:172.25.80.199
RVBD-SSH 1 1 RVBD-SSH: ::ffff:172.17.12.199
Surrogate-Capability 8 5 Surrogate-Capability:srv015.guape.zigdigital.com.br
X-Tinyproxy 1 1 X-Tinyproxy: 10.192.9.79
X-If-Via 1 1 X-If-Via: 1.1 i-FILTER84982
Cache-Related
Cache-Control 750 106 Cache-Control: max-stale=0
Pragma 4 3 Pragma: no-cache
X-Loop-Control 35 2 X-Loop-Control: 151.233.132.133
If-Modified-Since 24 13 If-Modified-Since: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 15:07:56 GMT
If-None-Match 21 11 If-None-Match: ”90-52ecccfbb0285”
In Table 4.3, we list all instances of injected headers corresponding to proxies and caches. For
each header instance, we also provide the number of ASes and countries of the possible location
of the injection. As previously mentioned in our methodology, we infer the AS and country
of the source IP address of the received requests. This IP address will either be the one from
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the Luminati country peer or from a middlebox located between the country peer and our server.
Therefore, even though it is not the definitive location of the middlebox, it will be typically at
the edge of the Internet given the vantage points provided by Luminati. From how often these
headers are observed in different networks, we get a measure of the popularity of these two
important network functions overall. Meanwhile, we check the values of the injected headers
(see examples provided in the last column of Table 4.3). We find that the values of the headers
are consistent with the names of the headers, reflecting the related network functions played by
the corresponding middlebox.
The most frequently injected request header in our dataset is Cache-Control. This header sets
specific directives for cached copies, and is seen in about 7.5% of all ASes we sample in our
measurements. The next most popular injected header is Via, injected by proxies to inform
end points of its presence, sometimes also adding information about the name and version of the
middlebox. We observed the Via header across 695 ASes in 117 countries. Middleboxes do more
than tell their functions. They also add private information about the end-point originating the
HTTP request, as from the X-Forwarded-For header that carries the IP address of the original
client. Doing this is surprising, if the intended usage of proxy is to provide anonymity for end
users, since adding the IP address of the original client defeats the very purpose of proxying,
by revealing to the server the originator of the query. The next most popular injected header is
X-Proxy-ID, seen in 178 ASes across 58 countries, which carries the identifiers of the proxies.
Injected HTTP headers also reveal a significant number of vendor-specific middleboxes. For
example, X-IWS-Via and X-IWSaaS-Via are headers added by Trend Micro middleboxes, run-
ning the InterScan Web Security service. InterScan Web Security (IWS) is a software appliance
that dynamically protects traffic flows on Internet gateway [72]. Another expected header is X-
IWSaaS-Via, from the Amazon cloud instance inside a Japanese data center. Beside the typical
functions of proxying and caching, we find headers related to services such as private IP map-
ping (X-Tinyproxy), traffic flows filtering (X-If-Via) and WAN optimization (RVBD-CSH and
RVBD-SSH). Although not very common, these instances provide evidence of the diversity of
roles played by middleboxes in today’s Internet, way beyond the usual functions such as caching
and proxying.
As shown in Figure 4.3, most of involved ASes are Tier-2 or customer networks, supporting our
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Figure 4.3: AS Classification of Injected Request Header
expectation that the middleboxes are generally located at the edge of networks.
4.1.2.2 Non-standard Request Header Injection
So far, we have studied injected headers for which the function of the middlebox is straightfor-
ward, because the header is well known or the name strongly suggests its function. This is not
always the case unfortunately. When the header does not tell us its purpose, we try to guess its
function based on its name or its network.
Mobile devices/networks request header injection In Table 4.4, we list a set of headers for
which we could guess the purpose. We also provide the name of the networks from which the
requests come, and the countries of these networks.
We observe that some headers are used to expose information about cellular networks and the
mobile devices that use these networks. For example, x-gateway and o2gw-id are specially used
in the O2 (GB) mobile network, to carry the ID and location of gateways [29]. X-Roaming
and X-RAT-TYPE are both injected to describe the radio technology used in a particular mobile
network.
From either the name of the header, or the network where the middlebox is located, it is obvious
that the headers shown in Table 4.4 are used for mobile devices and mobile networks. Unex-
pectedly, looking at the content of the headers reveals information about the mobile users, which
is visible to the server-side. Unfortunately, despite the huge number of vantage points provided
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Table 4.4: Request Headers Exposing Mobile Network and Device Information.
Injected Header # of ASes # of countries
x-gateway 1 (O2-ONLINE) 1 (GB)
o2gw-id 1 1








X-Roaming 1 (MTNSS) 1 (SS)
X-RAT-TYPE 1 1
MSISDN 2 (ZAIN, Jordan Tele) 2 (IQ,JO)
msisdn 2 (AXIATA,globacom) 2 (BD,NG)
mpesaMsisdn 1 (VODAFONE) 1 (RO)
by Luminati, we only observed this in 8 ASes, 4 of them could be classified. Two of them are
customer networks, and the other two are Tier-2 networks. As much as Luminati provides van-
tage points at the edge of the Internet, few of these are actually located inside mobile networks,
at least as seen from modified HTTP headers. Our results suggest that relying on vantage points
located inside mobile networks is necessary to better sample middleboxes deployed across the
Internet.
Remaining injected headers The remaining injected headers are either non-standard, or have
names or values that make it challenging, though sometimes possible, to guess the purpose of the
HTTP header or the function of the corresponding middlebox. We list these on Table 4.5. We
provide the name, country of the network (when found) and example values.
Some injected headers nicely exemplify specific types of middlebox interference, such as URL
filtering, real-time content filtering, or the specific networks where the middleboxes are deployed,
e.g., mobile networks or cloud providers. For example, the x-up-vfza-id header is added by the
VODACOM network, revealing the ID of the upstream gateway inside the mobile network. The
headers with the prefix X-TMCE are added by Trend Micro middleboxes, and from looking at
the AS number of the Luminati proxy, these headers are injected for the IWSaaS service inside
the Amazon cloud platform. Similarly, the headers containing FFI and HCF are likely to be
added by specific vendor devices. The X-FCCKV2 header is added by middleboxes running the
Fortinet software for traffic filtering [7]. Finally, despite its rather generic name, the Server-Slot
header is added by a middlebox inside the French cloud computing company OVH. OVH offers
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VPS, dedicated server and other web services, suggesting that the original request went through
some web host running inside a cloud instance before reaching our target server.
Table 4.5: Remaining Injected Request Headers.
Injected Header AS Num/ISP Country Note
x-up-vfza-id 1 (VODACOM-AS) 1 (ZA) x-up-vfza-id: 65501
x-subscriber-info x-subscriber-info: 10.139.195.196














HCFVer 1 (TTNET) 1 (TR) HCFVer: 3.7.18
HCFType HCFType: server
X-FCCKV2 2 (ENERGOTEL,TTSLMEIS) 2 (SK,IN) X-FCCKV2: GAJ3kZcRPNFiiMihhS2K......
X-Bloxx-Result 1 (DATAWEB B.V) 1 (NL) X-Bloxx-Result: [201, 203, 250, 251, 254,
255, 260, 261, 266, 267, 401, 425, 3009]
Server-Slot 1 (OVH) 1 (FR) Server-Slot:ovh01FR.openvpn.wifiprotector...
Referer 2 (NHN-AS,CHINA-UNICOM) 2 (KR,CN) Referer: http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=www
X-delete-header 1 (CHINANET-BACKBONE) 1 (CN) X-delete-header: gzip
Accept-Xncoding 1 (Bezeqint Internet Backbone) 1 (IL) Accept-Xncoding: gzip
NCLIENT50 2 (VIA-NUMERICA,Hanyang
University)
2 (FR,KR) NCLIENT50: NCLIENT50
serialnumber 1 (INFOCLIP-AS) 1 (FR) serialnumber: V2401625
4.1.2.3 Summary
Overall, our results from HTTP request header manipulation demonstrate the variety of different
middleboxes deployed inside today’s networks, and their many purposes and behaviours. From
injected HTTP headers inside requests, we found that proxies and caches are the prevalent type
of middlebox, and these are deployed world-wide, more than 100 countries. Despite relying on
the Luminati probing infrastructure that does not particularly sample well mobile networks or
cloud providers, we still found evidence of middleboxes in these networks. Finally, we observed
multiple instances of vendor-specific middleboxes, which define their own HTTP headers, or of
service-specific behaviours outside proxying and caching.
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4.1.3 Response Header Manipulation
n this section, we explore HTTP response header manipulation, as well as web page blocking
specifically. Before going into details of the response header manipulation, let us mention that
most of the middlebox interference observed on the downstream part (by the client receiving
the response) overlaps with the middlebox functions observed in the upstream direction. As
previously mentioned, this makes sense as middleboxes typically are stateful devices, that see
both directions of the traffic. However, this does not imply that HTTP header manipulation
will take place in both directions for a given flow, or that the same headers will be affected.
Therefore, one cannot expect that HTTP header manipulation in the two directions of the traffic
will be similar, but at best consistent.
4.1.3.1 Response Header Injection
Proxies/Caches response header injection Expectedly, similar to the case of HTTP request
headers, most instances of injected response headers relate to proxying and caching, such as
the cache hit record, the age for the cached copies and proxy connection status.
Table 4.6: Response Header Injection.




X-Cache 519 105 X-Cache: MISS from localhost
X-Cache-Lookup 401 99 X-Cache-Lookup: MISS from localhost:3128
Age 216 53 Age: 0




48 5 X-CFLO-Cache-Result: TCP MISS
X-Loop-Control 22 2 X-Loop-Control: 5.202.228.198 179F97......
X-Cache-Full 11 1 X-Cache-Full: MISS from myauth.pirai.rj.gov.br
Vary 7 6 Vary: *
X-Cache-Debug 1 1 X-Cache-Debug: TCP MISS/NODNS-IIP/-
SPINE-CACHE 1 1 SPINE-CACHE: MISS
ANIS-CACHE 1 1 ANIS-CACHE: MISS
Proxy-Related
Proxy-Connection: 128 52 Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
X-Cnection 23 7 X-Cnection: close
X-OSSProxy 19 16 X-OSSProxy: OSSProxy 1.3.337.376 (Build
337.376 Win32 en-us)(Apr 22 2016 15:45:25)
X-Squid-Error 9 6 X-Squid-Error: ERR-READ-ERROR 104
Third Party Server Set-Cookie 2 2 Set-Cookie: xodbpb=; Path=/; HttpOnly
As shown in Table 4.6, X-Cache is the most frequently added response header, observed from
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519 ASes across 105 countries1. The next most popular, X-Cache-Lookup is observed in 401
ASes, nearly 4% of all ASes we observe. Both of them are used to handle cache implementation
details.
Surprisingly, we find the header Set-Cookie injected in some of our responses, while the server
should be adding it, not a middlebox. Although we could not identify the host that actually
sets these cookies, the injection implies the existence of a third-party server (or a middlebox)
responsible for such an injection. Though we do not see the third-party actually tracking the
browsing behaviour of the client, the existence of such a third-party constitutes a privacy risk for
end-users who are unlikely to be aware of its presence.
Compared to the injected request headers, we see less information about the unique user or
gateway is injected in the response headers by the middleboxes. We observe 12 injected request
headers that carry the information about the original user (private IP address) and the name or
identification of proxies. Only two injected response headers record the cache hit results, carrying
information about caches on the path. Although upstream and downstream traffic flows are likely
to cross the same middleboxes, the middlebox interference we observe in both directions of
the traffic is different. More private information about subnets or clients is added to requests
compared to responses.
Remaining response header injection Similar to the request header situation, Table 4.7 shows
the non-standard injected response headers. Again, in such cases we need to guess the purpose of
the header. From our inference, it appears that most of these injected headers carry information
related to content filtering and identification of middleboxes in different networks. However,
we did not find any specific network function that would generally apply in these cases. For
instance, X-IS-ELAPSED and X-IS-FILTER are injected in the same request, but from the
values of these two headers we could not infer their function. From their name, we guess they
are likely to be injected for filtering. Headers such as those with the X-Nokia prefix, or X-
Android, are injected by the Android operating system, and therefore related to middleboxes
located in wireless or mobile networks. The Client-Date, Client-Peer and Client-Response-
Num headers are injected by SmarTone, the mobile network operator in Hong Kong. This shows
1Different from the case of requests, for responses we rely on the IP address of the country peer to
infer the AS number and country of this header modification.
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that consistently with the upstream case, we see evidence of middleboxes in mobile networks
from the downstream direction of the traffic.
Table 4.7: Injected Response Headers Requiring Inference.




















4.1.3.2 Response Header Modification and Removal
For response headers, we also observe header removals (Table 4.9) and value modifications (Ta-
ble 4.8). Though we do not have explicit evidence about the type of middlebox in these cases,
a large portion of the ASes for these headers overlap with those involved in the Via, Cache-
Control and X-Forwarded-For headers in the requests. For example, as shown in Table 4.8,
77% of ASes for which Accept-Range modifications occur overlap with the ASes involved in
request header injection. This suggests that these modifications and removals are actually done
by the same middleboxes in both directions.
Overlapping ASes also give us the opportunity to look at cases where the ASes from the requests
and responses differ. Indeed, when the IP address seen in the request received by the server
differs from the IP address seen in the response (identifying the country peer), this means that
the former IP address belongs to a TCP-terminating middlebox. We therefore count such IP
addresses (1025), ASes (168), and countries (55) where these are located. Unfortunately, these
statistics provide us only with a very poor lower bound on the number of middleboxes and net-
works observed, compared to the evidence from the HTTP header manipulation. Indeed, from
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the sheer HTTP manipulation we observed, we found evidence of middleboxes in 1011 ASes
from the requests, and in 1023 ASes for responses.
Some response header modifications and removals may affect the end-to-end performance. For
example, some proxies modify or remove the value of the Accept-Ranges header, to disable byte
serving. As byte serving allows the server to partially deliver the content, modifying the value of
Accept-Ranges can very well affect the content transfer. Also, the removal of the Last-Modified
and Etag headers may affect the updating of cached copies.
Table 4.8: Modified Response Headers (with AS overlap).
Modified
Header
# of ASes # of overlap ASes # of countries
Content-Length 191 108 (57%) 75
Accept-Ranges 61 47 (77%) 38
Content-Type 37 20 (54%) 24
Server 26 15 (58%) 17
Table 4.9: Removed Response Headers (with AS overlap).
Removed
Header
# of ASes # of overlap ASes # of countries
Last-Modified 143 84 (59%) 65
Accept-Ranges 107 64 (71%) 50
Content-Length 85 52 (51%) 36
Etag 73 42 (58%) 39
Server 33 21 (64%) 20
4.1.3.3 Summary
All in all, the manipulations of HTTP responses confirm the diversity of network functions played
by today’s middleboxes. Similar to the case of request headers, most of the injected response
headers are added by proxies and caches. As shown in Figure 4.4, the classification of ASes
which inject new headers inside responses is quite similar to those that do so on the requests. Al-
though the types of injected headers are different between requests and responses, the consistency
in the trends in both directions of the traffic possibly indicate that the same middleboxes indeed
affect both directions of the traffic. From the downstream part of the traffic, we observed header
manipulations that may potentially negatively impact end-to-end performance. Finally, we also
observed instances of page blocking, exposing the URL filtering function of middleboxes.
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Figure 4.4: AS Classification of Injected Response Header
4.1.4 Conclusion
In our results, we studied the presence of multiple types of HTTP-interfering middleboxes in
today’s networks. We observed a large number and variety of injected headers, demonstrating the
prevalence of HTTP-interfering middleboxes across the Internet. The main middlebox functions
identified from these interactions are proxying, caching, filtering and NAT. Despite the limited
number of instances, we also observed HTTP header manipulation done by mobile networks and
cloud providers, providing evidence for widespread deployment of middleboxes in the Internet.
4.2 Middlebox Location
To investigate the location of involved middleboxes, we launch traceroute-like probes to pinpoint
the approximate hop range where the interference takes place. From prior section, we already
got the IP lists of all the available country peers. To maximize the usage of our data and explore
the ASes deeper, we extended our work to send crafted HTTP responses with increasing TTL
values from our servers to all available country peers.
4.2.1 Information about Last Returned ICMP Reply
Analysing the received ICMP time-exceeded replies, we compared the ASes of available country
peers and last hops which returned ICMP reply back to our servers. Also, to investigate more
about the last ICMP replies and involved ASes, we figured out the types of ASes with same
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classifier [71], which are used for our Luminati dataset.
Table 4.10: Comparing ASes between Country Peers and Last Hops
Total number Last hop in same
AS
Last hop in different AS
# of IPs 349,617 229,955 (65.77%) 119,662
# of ASes 9450 5749 (60.83%) 5734 (2033 are overlapped)
Table 4.11: AS Classifications of Last Hops




Network Information Center 40
Tier 1 40
Tier 2 1429
Missing Sufficient Information 159
Unclassified 3952
In total, we sent traceroute-like probes to 372,603 IP addresses which are distributed in 9634
ASes. While, since some IP addresses of last hops could not map to ASes (the mapped result
is null), we got the IP addresses of last hops for 349,617 probes successfully, and nearly 66%
of probes could receive ICMP replies from same ASes of target country peers (shown in Ta-
ble 4.10). Furthermore, we classified the corresponding ASes of last hops which returned last
ICMP time-exceeded replies. As shown in Table 4.11, most of last hops are distributed at the
edge of networks.
4.2.2 Observation of Response Header Injection
Although it is hard to use Luminati to locate middleboxes, we explored the injected response
headers again by checking the ASes of last hops to explore ASes between servers and coun-
try peers. From Section 4.1, we already analysed the IP addresses and corresponding ASes of
country peers which were injected new response headers. We counted each country peer as one
sample, compared the ASes of country peers and last hops, inferring the approximate place that
where the header injection took place.
As shown in Figure 4.5, most of last hops of samples are in the same ASes of country peers. The
manipulation may take place in same ASes of country peers, and the location of middleboxes may
be close to client side. In contract, some cache related headers may be injected from different
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Figure 4.5: ASes Comparison between Last Hops and Involved Country Peers
ASes. For example, SPINE-CACHE and ANIS-CACHE are injected by vendor-specific caches,
and the last received ICMP replies are all from different ASes. Although the number of samples
is only 4, we inferred that these two types of vendor-specific caches may be TCP-terminating
middleboxes, located in the middle between clients and servers.
4.2.3 Summary
In conclusion, we explored the IP addresses and corresponding ASes of last hops which returns
ICMP time-exceeded replies between country peers and servers. In our results, nearly 66%
of samples receive ICMP replies from hops which are close to country peers. For the rest of
samples, we guess that there may be middleboxes on the path which open new TCP connections
with servers. However, our current work could not locate the actual position of middleboxes, and
the results are more or less affected by returned ICMP time-exceeded replies . In order to probe
and explore more deeply on the paths, more methodologies are needed for locating middleboxes




In brief, we describe our methodologies and provide an abundant insight on HTTP-interacting
middleboxes. According to our results, we believe that our methodologies will be useful for
understanding the middlebox interference on traffic flows, inferring and identifying the involved
networks. However, when we tried to measure the middleboxes on large scale, we noticed some
limitations on our methodologies, samples and dataset. In this chapter, we explain these limita-
tions and discuss how to extend our work in the future work.
5.1 Limitations on Methodology
5.1.1 Discussion about Client-Server Architecture
As mentioned in Section 3.1, our methodologies control both end hosts to adopt a client-server
architecture, generating and capturing traffic flows in both directions. As the paths between two
end hosts are complicated, the locations of clients and servers affect the behaviour of middle-
boxes. Futhermore, some middleboxes are reported to be stateful devices, the directions of traffic
flows also affect the middlebox interference. However, our current work did not cover the selec-
tion of clients and servers. If we could control more vantage instances in the future, we could
investigate more behaviour of middleboxes.
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In order to run the application traffic flows as we designed, we need the root permission to access
vantage points. However, it is a challenge for sampling across the Internet. Although we could
make use of the virtual machines in some commercial cloud infrastructures, such as Amazon
Web Service (AWS) , Google Cloud Platform (GCP) and so on, the number and distribution of
instances are not enough for our large-scale measurement. For the purpose of extending our
work, we need design other methodologies to run scripts, or collect more volunteers in varied
networks to detect different types of middlebox interference.
Presently, we treat all middleboxes as one blackbox in our client-server model. While, it is pos-
sible that multiple middleboxes are located between two end hosts. In addition, one middlebox
could operate from network layer to application layer. It is hard to figure out the accurate number
or individual behaviour of each middlebox by using our current methodologies.
5.1.2 Limitations on Application Probe
Implemented with Luminati, we reproduced HTTP traffic flows and detected HTTP-interacting
middleboxes in our results. We believe that our methodologies will be suitable to measure the
further performance of applications in next step. However, the reproduced traffic flows are lim-
ited. Considering the ethical issues when we reproduce traffic flows from users, the probes are
limited to be standard application traffic messages without any triggers of filtering, blocking or
other behaviours of Internet censorship.
One the other hand, Internet traffic is changing (e.g., HTTPS accounts for a significant percentage
of application traffic flows now), and the corresponding policies of middleboxes are evolving.
HTTP traffic flows are not enough to investigate the behaviour of middleboxes. We need extend
our work to HTTPS, understand how middleboxes interfere with the encrypted traffic flows and
investigate the corresponding effect on the performance of HTTPS.
5.1.3 Limitations on Traceroute-Like Locating
Making good use of ICMP messages is a key method to locate middleboxes hop by hop. How-
ever, the traceroute-like locating methods are limited with the returned ICMP time-exceeded
replies. As described in Section 3.4.2, some routers do not return the ICMP time-exceeded
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replies, and some middleboxes modify the returned replies again in the downstream direction.
We could not illustrate the accurate behaviour of middleboxes at each hop, and the result of
location is rounded to approximate hop range where the interference takes place.
In addition, the types of returned ICMP replies also affect our detecting and locating the ma-
nipulation of traffic flows. According to RFC792 [41], the returned ICMP time-exceeded reply
should quote the IP header and the next eight bytes of original packet. Meanwhile, RFC1812 [42]
suggested to quote the entire IP packet in ICMP time-exceeded reply, but this recommendation
has not been widely implemented. The more contents of original probes quoted in the ICMP
replies, the more manipulation we could detect.
5.2 Limitations on Luminati
Thanks to Luminati, we could be able to launch HTTP requests and receive responses from
more than 350,000 available country peers distributed in nearly 10,000 ASes. According to our
dataset and results, the samples of Luminati are from different types of networks, which provide
enough evidences to show the presence of middleboxes. However, since the super proxies and
all country peers are based on Hola network, the measurement crawler does not have root access
to available country peers. As discussed in prior section, the locations of clients and servers
affect our detection. With Luminati, we could not select or change the location of clients. Since
crawler only receive HTTP responses from super proxy, it is not possible for us to confirm how
the traffic flows are filtered or dropped between super proxy and country peer. Also, the probes
with increasing TTL values could not be reproduced from the country peers, which means that
we could not locate the middleboxes from upstream direction.
Furthermore, Luminati controls the selection of country peers. Although Luminati provides dif-
ferent types of users (e.g. mobile device user, desktop user), we do not have the right to make
choices. Also, the number of available country peers is varied with time. If we could launch our
requests in a longer term, our results could cover more ASes and present more types of middle-
boxes inside networks. Overall, in order to make use of millions of country peers from Luminati,
we need to better estimate our samples, value the sheer number of middleboxes deployed across
the Internet in the future.
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5.3 Limitations on AS Classification
In our results, we investigated the involved AS by classifying the types of ASes. We experimented
with three classifiers. CAIDA’s AS ranking [73] is an up-to-date classifier which provides great
coverage of ASes. However, the categories of ASes are quite coarse, and there are only three
categories: Transit, Content and Enterprise. Compared with CAIDA AS ranking, the classifier
provided by Dhamdhere [74] and the one provided by Dimitropoulos [71] have lower recall,
but the classification is a slightly finer-grained. In our work, we used the classifier provided
by Dimitropoulos, which offered similar recall with [74], but with a finer grained classification.
Whilst, there are nearly 67% of ASes are unclassified in our result. Therefore, we argue that better
classification must be developed to investigate the involved ASes, and give better understand of
behaviour of middleboxes in varied networks.
5.4 Summary
In summary, we discuss the limitations of our work from different aspects of methodology, sam-
ple collection and data classification. Middleboxes affect the traffic flows on both directions of
traffic flows, and the types of interference are not only packet manipulation, but also filtering and
injection. We need adopt a client-server architecture to generate and capture traffic flows from
both end hosts. However, these requirements make sampling harder. To do the large-scale mea-
surement, we need design more methods to collect volunteers or samples across Internet to count
and locate middleboxes in the future. Also, we should include the selection of servers in our
future work, detecting other behaviours by changing locations of clients and servers or directions
of traffic flows.
Luminati is an important platform for us to collect samples. Although we could not control the
selection of these country peers and do not have the access to these vantage points, the significant
scale of samples provide lots of valuable data to analyze. Furthermore, since Luminati provides
HTTPS traffic flows at the same time and HTTPS plays an increasingly significant role in our
network. We could extend our methods and make use of millions of country peers in Luminati to




In this report, we firstly give an introduction to middleboxes from the definition in theory to the
behaviour in varied networks; present our motivations to illustrate why it is important to study the
middleboxes and measure the effect of interference on traffic flows. We describe our methodolo-
gies and explain the differences between other related work, emphasising the reasons that why
we need our methods. Deploying our methodologies in a commercial P2P network Luminati,
we find the presence of middleboxes in different networks, manipulating traffic flows for imple-
menting more network functions, enhancing the visibility of network traffic flows and enable the
enforcement of security policies. At the same time, detected middleboxes provide us changes to
infer and investigate the involved ASes.
As a new kind of device in today’s network, middleboxes break the end-to-end network model,
split connections between two end hosts, interfere with the traffic flows, and provide functions for
security and performance improvement. However, as middleboxes and networks are all compli-
cated, we have the limited knowledge about what happens in the middle and how the interference
affects the performance of applications. It is critical to detect and measure the behaviour of mid-
dlboxes and have a deeper understanding of types of networks inspected.
In our work, we introduce the methodology to detect middlebox interference based on a client-
server architecture. The clients and servers are both controlled and programmable to reproduce
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traffic flows with different application payloads. Furthermore, adopting a client-server architec-
ture provides us abilities to generate and capture exchanged traffic flows in both directions. To
better implement our methods and conduct a large-scale dataset, we introduce the commercial
platform Luminati platform and explain how to develop our methodology with it. Thanks to Lu-
minati, we find evidence for a significant amount of middlebox interference on the traffic flows
in different networks. Our results demonstrate the presence of varied HTTP-interacting middle-
boxes in nearly 1,000 ASes across 196 countries We observe a wide variety of injected HTTP
headers in HTTP requests, some known and some never reported before. Surprisingly, we even
observe new headers that are only added by mobile networks and cloud platforms. Overall, we
find that injected headers expose the presence of multiple types of middleboxes across diverse
networks. Further, the interference on HTTP responses often reveals the corresponding functions
of the middleboxes, such as proxying, caching, URL filtering, and WAN optimization. Analysing
the types of involved ASes and probing with the increasing TTL valuses responses, we find that
most of interference happends at the edge of network.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Luminati and our methodologies have some limitations. In the future,
we need extend our methodologies with the selection of clients or servers, change the traffic
directions between two end hosts, and try to investigate the stateful behaviour of middleboxes.
At the same time, more methodologies are needed for sampling and collecting volunteers in
varied networks, launching probes from multiple types of ASes, giving a better estimate of the
number of middleboxes in the Internet, as well as their actual impact. Since Luminati has a
large-scale country peers to forward HTTP/HTTPS messages, we plan to make good use of
HTTPS messages, explore the middlebox interference on encrypted traffic. Last but not least,
our current work focuses on the interference and behaviour of middleboxes, we should extend
our measurement to examine the effect on application performance, such as detecting the impact
on packet loss, delay and other performance factors.
61
References
[1] S. W. Brim and B. E. Carpenter, “Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues.” RFC 3234, Mar.
2013.
[2] J. Sherry, S. Hasan, C. Scott, A. Krishnamurthy, S. Ratnasamy, and V. Sekar, “Making
middleboxes someone else’s problem: Network processing as a cloud service,” in ACM
SIGCOMM 2012 Conference, SIGCOMM ’12, Helsinki, Finland - August 13 - 17, 2012,
pp. 13–24.
[3] “Guide to intrusion detection and prevention systems(idps).” http://ecinetworks.
com/wp-content/uploads/bsk-files-manager/86_SP800-94.pdf.
[4] N. Freed, “Behavior of and Requirements for Internet Firewalls.” RFC 2979, Nov. 2015.
[5] G. Detal, B. Hesmans, O. Bonaventure, Y. Vanaubel, and B. Donnet, “Revealing middlebox
interference with tracebox,” in Proceedings of the 2013 Internet Measurement Conference,
IMC 2013, Barcelona, Spain, October 23-25, 2013, pp. 1–8.
[6] “Wan optimization.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WAN_optimization.
[7] N. Weaver, C. Kreibich, M. Dam, and V. Paxson, “Here be web proxies,” in Passive and
Active Measurement - 15th International Conference, PAM 2014, Los Angeles, CA, USA,
March 10-11, 2014, pp. 183–192.
[8] “Network caching technologies.” http://docwiki.cisco.com/wiki/Network_
Caching_Technologies#Proxy_Servers.
[9] “Middlebox.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middlebox.
[10] Z. Wang, Z. Qian, Q. Xu, Z. M. Mao, and M. Zhang, “An untold story of middleboxes in
cellular networks,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 Conference on Applica-
tions, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications, Toronto,
ON, Canada, August 15-19, 2011, pp. 374–385.
62
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